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Conference recommended the insertion of this provision. This sub-
section vests in the appellate court the discretion, when the in-
terests of justice so demand, to treat as valid and effective a
notice of appeal which is either premature or which contains an
incorrect description of the order or judgment appealed from.
ATicL-E 57-APPEALS TO THE APPELLATE DIsION
CPLR 5704(b): Amendment.
This amendment eliminates a limitation on the general appellate
power of the appellate term in the first and second departments.
Prior to the CPLR, the appellate term could hear ex parte orders
under their rules only from expressly enumerated courts. The
original CPLR section limited the hearing of ex parte orders to
the Civil Court of the City of New York. The new amendment
eliminates this limitation, and provides that the appellate term
may review such orders made "by any court or a judge thereof
from which an appeal would lie to such appellate term ...
ARTICLE 62 - ATTACHiaENT
CPLR 6212: Recovery for legal services allowed in wrongful
attachment when there is inducement and causation.
Upon a motion for an order of attachment, the moving party
is required to furnish an undertaking promising to pay all of the
defendant's legal fees sustained by reason of the attachment "if the
defendant recovers judgment or if it is finally decided that the
plaintiff was not entitled to an attachment of the defendant's
property .... 102 The present wording of the statute was em-
ployed by the revisers to make clear that "the undertaking is not
to be used to pay the defendant if an attachment is vacated for
merely technical defects . . . [or where] it is no longer neces-
sary." 103 Where, however, the cause of action, as a matter of law,
did not furnish a basis for a warrant of attachment, the defendant
cannot later recover the cost of legal services in vacating the
attachment.' 4 The reason for this rule is that the defendant should
not recover his legal costs where he has proceeded to defend on
the merits and thereby incurred additional expenses if the attach-
ment could have been vacated by motion.105
102 CPLR 612b) ; see 7 WENSl, KoRN & MzlE, NEw YORK CIVI
PrAcTicE 111 6212.07-.08 (1965).
103 TH D REP. 341.
04 Olsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 230 N.Y. 31, 128 N.E.
908 (1920). This was an equity action to compel 'specific performance
of a contract for money damages, whereas plaintiff is entitled to an order
of attachment only in an action for a money judgment.
105 Id. at 36; 128 N.E. at 909.
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On the other hand, where a non-domiciliary has property in
New York, an attachment on this property is valid on its face
for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the court 106 and would
not be subject to a motion to dismiss. Therefore, where the
non-domiciliary defendant brings an action to recover his legal
expenses, the question presented is whether they were incurred
by reason of the attachment. 1 7 A defendant must use every remedy
available before resorting to a trial on the merits, so that the
chain of causation is not broken if a trial is required.2° Likewise,
since an attachment against the property of a non-domiciliary can
normally be vacated only after a trial on the merits, it must be
concluded that where there is such a trial, the non-domiciliary can
be said to have been induced into the state by the attachment.20
In A.C. Israel Commodity Co. v. Banco Do Brasil, S.A., 110
the defendant had procured an attachment on plaintiff's property
in a prior action. This attachment was, however, vacated on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon
which a claim could be recognized in New York. The plaintiff,
in the instant case, sought a judgment for the cost of legal services
rendered in obtaining and sustaining the vacatur of attachment.
The court held that such expenses were recoverable as damages,
since there was causation and inducement; they were the natural
and proximate consequences of the wrongful attachment.
It is significant to note that the damages allowed in this
action included the cost of counsel fees on appeal of the vacatur.
The court reasoned that these fees should be recoverable since
both the attachment proceedings and appeals were induced by the
warrant of attachment, and since there was a reasonable appre-
hension that reversal of the vacatur would cause the plaintiff
an undue financial burden. Since the plaintiff [the defendant in the
prior action] was doing business in this state, it was apparently
amenable to personal service without the necessity of the attach-
ment. Thus, this action by Banco Do Brasil in procuring the attach-
ment order and in seeking to uphold it may have been decisive
on the question of inducement. Nevertheless, based on all the
circumstances the court found that both causation and inducement
were present.
100 See CPLR 6201(1). This section provides that an order may be
granted in any action where the plaintiff has demanded a money judgment
against a defendant where the latter is a foreign corporation or a non-
domiciliary. Thus, through the section, jurisdiction over the defendant
is obtained.
107 Thropp v. Erb, 255 N.Y. 75, 174 N.E. 67 (1930).
108 Id. at 79, 174 N.E. at 68. "No futile motion is necessary to complete
the chain of causation between the warrant of attachment and the ex-
penses incurred in the successful defense." Ibid.
109 Id. at 80-81, 174 N.E. at 69.
11050 Misc. 2d 362, 270 N.Y.S2d 283 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
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This decision clarifies the law in New York. Now there is
a direct holding that where there is a wrongful attachment, legal
services rendered, both in the trial court and on appeal, are re-
coverable as an element of damages provided inducement and
causation are shown.
ARTICLE. 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: State not insulated from arbitration by sovereign
immunity.
In Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, New York State
has waived its sovereign immunity and, in Section 9, it has provided
that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
suits involving tort and contract claims wherein the state is a
defendant. However, this waiver of immunity only applies where
the "claimant complies with the limitations of this article," 11
and where there has been a direct waiver of sovereign inununity.1 22
Prior decisions have stated that where the party sued is an
agency of the state, it was incumbent upon the courts to interpret
the relationship between the agency and the state to determine
whether the agency or authority was an "arm of the state." 113
For example, it has been held that the New York Thruway
Authority was an "arm of the state," and that suit against it was
forbidden in all state courts except the Court of Claims.11 4 On the
other hand, in Braun v. State,"15 the court held that the New York
State Dormitory Authority was "a separate body politic, for whose
tortious acts the State was not responsible";"16 and, therefore,
a suit against the authority could be brought in another court of
the state.
In Dormitory Auth. v. Span Elec. Corp.,117 the Court of
Appeals held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not
1 CT. Cr. AcT § 8.
1' Benz v. New York State Thruway Auth., 9 N.Y.2d 486, 489, 174
N.E2d 727, 728, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (1961).
113 See, e.g., Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d
420, 158 N.E2d 238, 185 N.Y.S2d 534 (1959).
114 Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., I N.Y.2d 374, 135 N.E,2d
572, 153 N.Y.S2d 28 (1956). See N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW §§ 350-75.215 203 Misc. 563, 117 N.Y.S2d 601 (Ct. Cl. 1952). The enabling act
which established the Dormitory Authority is found in N.Y. Pun. AuTH.
LAw §§ 1675-90.
128 Braun v. State, 203 Misc. 563, 564, 177 N.Y.S2d 601, 602 (Ct. CI.
1952). See also Thompson Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth., 48 Misc. 2d
296, 298, 264 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965).
117 18 N.Y.2d 114, 218 N.E2d 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1966).
